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Abstract
Quality problem or issue: A number of challenges have been identiﬁed with current risk assess-
ment practice in hospitals, including: a lack of consultation with a sufﬁciently wide group of stake-
holders; a lack of consistency and transparency; and insufﬁcient risk assessment guidance.
Consequently, risk assessment may not be fully effective as a means to ensure safety.
Initial assessment: We used a V system developmental model, in conjunction with mixed meth-
ods, including interviews and document analysis to identify user needs and requirements.
Choice of solution: One way to address current challenges is through providing good guidance on
the fundamental aspects of risk assessment. We designed a risk assessment framework, compris-
ing: a risk assessment model that depicts the main risk assessment steps; risk assessment explan-
ation cards that provide prompts to help apply each step; and a risk assessment form that helps to
systematize the risk assessment and document the ﬁndings.
Implementation: We conducted multiple group discussions to pilot the framework through the
use of a representative scenario and used our ﬁndings for the user evaluation.
Evaluation: User evaluation was conducted with 10 participants through interviews and showed
promising results.
Lessons learned:While the framework was recommended for use in practice, it was also proposed
that it be adopted as a training tool. With its use in risk assessment, we anticipate that risk assess-
ments would lead to more effective decisions being made and more appropriate actions being
taken to minimize risks. Consequently, the quality and safety of care delivered could be improved.
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Introduction
Across the world, healthcare has devoted substantial attention to
ensuring safety [1–4]. A number of studies have been published,
such as in relation to safety culture [4] and the reduction of harm
[5–8]. Through continuing efforts to improve safety, reforms have
been proposed that have been driven by safety–critical industries
(e.g. nuclear and aviation), such as the implementation of risk man-
agement system [9]. So far, however, such reforms have largely
prioritized the investigation of incidents over their prevention in the
ﬁrst place [3]. An approach which focuses on risk assessment [10–12]
could complement this reactive practice. Risk assessment, as a part of
the overarching process of risk management, aims to identify, analyse
and evaluate risks that may have a negative inﬂuence on the quality
and safety of the care delivered [11, 13–16].
In the National Health Service in England (NHS England), hospitals
assess a range of risks, including wrong medication, delayed discharge,
patient claims and failure to comply with requirements. In so doing, hos-
pitals provide risk assessment guidelines and training to support their
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staff—often frontline and risk management staff—and external author-
ities support and investigate hospitals to deliver safe care [15, 17–19].
However, despite considerable efforts being made, a number of pro-
blems have been identiﬁed with current practice. For instance, patient
safety-related risks can be ignored at the organizational level, and health
information technology innovations can be assumed to be safe until
something goes wrong [20]; risk assessment techniques are little-used,
and if used, they may be used without training [12, 21]; risk register sys-
tems can be used as bureaucratic data collection rather than to diagnose
potential problems [19]; there can be a lack of consultation with a sufﬁ-
ciently wide group of stakeholders including patients [22]; risk assess-
ment practice is criticized as lacking in consistency and transparency
[17]; and the risk evaluation guidance provided is insufﬁcient, which
may lead to poor decisions being made [15]. Consequently, risk assess-
ment may be underutilized when attempts are made to ensure safety.
Many of the problems stem from the foundations of risk assess-
ment, including how to express risk, how to analyse it and how to
use risk assessment as a tool to improve patient safety [14]. One
way to address such problems is through providing good guidance
on the fundamental aspects of risk assessment [10, 23]. This paper,
therefore, reports the design process for—and content of—a risk
assessment framework (RAF). The RAF aims to guide healthcare
staff on risk assessment as well as to address current challenges by
learning from prescribed good risk assessment practice and the
experience of healthcare staff (e.g. doctors, nurses and managers).
Study design
This study adopted a V system developmental model [24, 25] (see
Fig. 1) to design the proposed RAF through the consideration of
user needs, requirements, multiple design concepts and the evalu-
ation of the selected concept.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with healthcare staff
from different professions in multiple acute hospitals in NHS England
to understand user needs in risk assessment (see Table 1). A purposive
sampling strategy was used to ensure participants had sufﬁcient
experience of risk assessment. All potential participants were known
to the research team, and we received permission to interview 12 indi-
viduals. The inclusion criterion was to select participants who had
been involved in at least one risk assessment. Interview questions
were developed based on the literature ﬁndings, with further input
from the research team and were then piloted with a healthcare
researcher. Participants were asked questions in relation to their
understanding of risk assessment (e.g. why and how to assess risks),
their practical experience in risk assessment (e.g. which methods to
use and how to prioritize risks), their recommendations on how to
improve risk assessment practice (e.g. participants’ views on the ter-
minology and methods used), their views on their own organizational
risk assessment guidelines, their views on good risk assessment prac-
tice (e.g. the accessibility and usability of the guidelines they use) and
the challenges that they experience when undertaking risk assessment.
Requirements for the new RAF were elicited from the interviews,
an extensive literature review and analysis of risk assessment-related
documents from 100 hospitals and 35 risk assessment standards from
other industries. The ﬁndings were reviewed by the authors to ensure
that there were no conﬂicting or inconsistent requirements. From this,
the authors identiﬁed 23 requirements to design the RAF (see Table 2).
Using the reﬁned list of requirements, through multiple discus-
sions the authors developed a range of design concepts, which were
ﬁnally reﬁned into a single concept. The authors then evaluated the
framework through the use of a scenario as follows:
In a hospital setting, a neurorehabilitation unit will be moved
from an old building to a new building, and the standards of the
patient rooms will be changed. Since there is a change in the sys-
tem, a risk assessment will be conducted to assess risks in the new
neurorehabilitation unit before the move occurs. As a part of this,
a risk assessment will be conducted to assess all risks in relation to
the patient’s accommodation in a single-bed patient room.
Figure 1 V system developmental model applied for the design of the RAF.
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User evaluation was conducted with 10 participants (8 were new
participants) (see Table 3). The evaluation interviews comprised two
parts. In the ﬁrst part, the author (G.K.K.) explained the how the
RAF could work with the risk assessment scenario given above. In
the second part, each participant discussed their views on the 17
predetermined statements. A Likert scale was then used by the
participants to rate their level of their agreement to each statement.
The average rating was calculated by assigning a score to each
Likert scale (i.e. ‘strongly agree = 5,’ ‘agree = 4, neutral = 3,’ ‘dis-
agree = 2’ and ‘strongly disagree = 1’) in order to aid numerical
analysis. In addition to the responses of the user evaluation state-
ments, participants provided brief comments on two open-ended
Table 1 The characteristics of the participants in the user needs interview
Identiﬁer Type of trust Job title Experience in
NHS (years)
Safety management training
T1 Acute Head of integrated clinical governance 38 Risk assessment, risk management, FMEA
and RCA
T2 Mental health Team leader 27 Risk assessment and suicide prevention
F1 Acute teaching An anaesthetist 9 Simulator training
T3 Other Head of patient safety investigation 33 Risk management
T4 Acute Clinical engineer 7 Managing safely, RCA and risk
management
T5 Acute Clinical engineer 10 Risk assessment
T6 Mental health Team leader 15 Risk assessment and risk management
T7 Mental health Patient safety practitioner 15 Risk assessment
T8 Other Risk management consultant 10 Health and safety risk assessment
T9 Acute teaching Quality improvement fellow 16 Risk management
F2 Acute specialist Head of nursing 30 Risk assessment, RCA and risk management
T10 Acute specialist Risk manager 30 Health and safety, risk management, RCA,
IOSH, risk ofﬁcer and human factors
T, telephone interviews; F, face-to-face interviews.
Table 2 Requirements for the design of the RAF
Requirement description Requirement sources
Standards Policies and
procedures
Interviews
1. The system should be described prior to the assessment [40–42] x
2. A comprehensive list of risk sources should be considered when identifying risks [27, 29, 43] x
3. Both known and unforeseen risks should be sought [44]
4. An event should be identiﬁed by considering objectives and links with other events [43, 45, 46] x x
5. Contributory factors to events should be identiﬁed [47, 48]
6. Consequences should be identiﬁed by considering all impact domains in line with both immediate and
knock-on effects
[40, 43, 49] x
7. Risks should be properly categorized to help the management of all risks [10] x x
8. All existing controls should be determined to estimate the real level of risk [40, 43, 50–53]
9. Risk scores should not be the sole basis on which to make risk-based decisions [40, 43] x
10. Uncertainties should be determined when assessing risks [54]
11. Tolerability of a risk should be determined based on risk level, codes of practice and comparison with
similar reference system(s)
[46]
12. Risks can be prioritized by consideration of risk levels in combination with other factors [55, 56] x
13. Eliminative, detective and reductive control actions should be listed [53] x
14. Risk assessment should be implemented utilizing assessment methods as well as communication and
consultation at all times
[40, 43, 57]
15. Risks should be documented, ﬁndings should be shared and risks should be monitored [40, 50] x x
16. Ordinary language should be used in risk assessment x
17. The improved approach should ﬁt on an A4 sheet x
18. The framework should support a quick risk assessment x
19. Risk assessment should be systematic x x
20. The framework should be easy to use x
21. The framework should be adaptable to all contexts and should guide the assessment of all types of
risks
x
22. The framework should be easily accessible when required x
23. The framework should be compatible with other risk assessments tools and methods x
3A framework to support risk assessment in hospitals
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questions to improve the initial version of the framework: ‘what is
familiar and what is new about the RAF?’ and ‘what changes would
you recommend to improve the RAF?’ and were given additional
space to add further comments.
The design of the RAF was then developed iteratively to improve
its usefulness and usability based on the comments given and discus-
sions between the authors.
Risk assessment framework
Having considered all requirements, an RAF was designed by the
authors, consisting of a risk assessment model, explanation cards
and a risk assessment form.
The risk assessment model comprises four phases (identify, analyse,
evaluate and manage), and each phase comprises four steps (see Fig. 2).
Each step is described on an A5 size double-sided explanation
card (see Appendix 1), which provides a number of prompts.
Table 4 summarizes these prompts at each risk assessment step.
These cards are designed to assist healthcare staff in undertaking
risk assessment since they bring together the key principles of risk
assessment. The risk assessment form is provided to document the
risk assessment ﬁndings (see Fig. 3).
In the identify phase, the system is described, potential undesired
events are deﬁned, their contributory factors are determined and
their potential consequences are identiﬁed. This phase seeks to
answer the question: ‘what might happen?’.
In the analyse phase, current controls are examined, and the
severity of the consequence, the likelihood of occurrence and the
level of risk are estimated. This step aims to address the question:
‘what is the level of risk?’.
In the evaluate phase, the estimated risk level is compared with
the risk criteria (e.g. up to a risk score of 9 is generally tolerable) to
decide whether or not the risk is tolerable and if there is any need to
take any action. Any controls required are listed, and ﬁndings of the
assessment are documented as well as shared. This phase, therefore,
aims to address the question: ‘is there any need for action?’.
In the manage phase, which interacts with all the phases of risk
assessment, a team is assembled, historical data are reviewed, techni-
ques to be used in risk assessment are identiﬁed, and all activities
related to these should be managed. Thus, this phase coordinates
the management of all steps to conduct effective risk assessment by
seeking to answer the question: ‘how to manage?’.
Evaluation of the RAF
The authors evaluated the framework by conducting a risk assess-
ment through the use of the predetermined scenario. The authors
identiﬁed 20 potential undesired events (e.g. patient falls); described
a wide range of contributory factors (e.g. staff tiredness) and mul-
tiple consequences for each potential undesired event (e.g. treatment
delay); examined current controls; estimated risk levels; evaluated
their tolerability; listed required controls (e.g. replacement of the
bed rails) and deﬁned actions associated with the controls (e.g.
responsibilities for implementation). This allowed the authors to
crudely evaluate the usefulness of the framework, and, therefore, to
develop the initial version of the framework iteratively. For instance,
the initial version of the framework encouraged risk sources to be
identiﬁed ﬁrst, followed by risk scenarios. Subsequently, this was
reversed, with the identiﬁcation of undesired events coming ﬁrst and
then contributory factors, which are considered as risk sources. This
was due to the fact that it was easier to identify the undesired event
Table 3 The characteristics of the interview participants for the evaluation
Identiﬁer Type of trust Job title Experience in
NHS (years)
Frequency of involvement
in a risk assessment
I1a Acute teaching 1 Anaesthetist 9 Rarely
I2 Acute teaching 1 Clinical scientist 15 Weekly
I3 Acute specialist 1 Head of risk management 15 Daily
I4 Acute specialist 1 Head of governance and improvement 8 Rarely
I5 Acute teaching 1 Clinical engineer 15 Bimonthly
I6 Acute teaching 2 Corporate risk manager 8 Weekly
I7a Acute specialist 2 Risk manager 34 Daily
I8 Other Consultant in risk leadership 25 A few times in a week
I9 Acute teaching 3 Quality and safety manager 10 Daily
I10 Acute teaching 4 Clinical director 35 Monthly
aParticipants who had also been involved in the previous interview process.
Figure 2 Risk assessment model.
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Table 4 A brief summary of the prompts provided for each assessment step
Assessment Step [Question to be responded to] Prompts to be considered
Identify—‘what might happen?’
1. Describe system to be assessed
‘What is being assessed and how does the system work?’
− Assessment aim
− System boundary
− System elements and their interactions
− System context
2. Deﬁne undesired events
‘What could go wrong?’
− System description
− Extreme cases
− Undesired event categories (e.g. clinical and organizational)
3. Determine contributory factors
‘What could contribute to the occurrence of undesired events?’
− Patient
− Staff
− Task
− Communication
− Equipment
− Control actions
− Organizational
− Environmental
4. Describe potential consequences
‘What are the potential consequences of the undesired events?’
− Impacts on people (e.g. harm)
− Impacts on organization (e.g. stafﬁng and claims)
− Impacts on environment (e.g. hospital waste)
− Immediate effects
− Knock-on effects
Analyse—‘what is the level of risk?’
5. Examine current controls
‘What are the current controls and how effective are they?’
− Controls to prevent undesired events
− Controls to detect undesired events
− Controls to reduce the severity of the consequences
− The level of effectiveness of these controls
6. Estimate severity
‘How severe are the described risks?’
− A rating scheme
− Consequence descriptions of each rating for each impact area
7. Estimate likelihood
‘What is the likelihood of occurrence of the consequences?’
− A rating scheme
− Frequency descriptions to be used for continuous operations
− Probability descriptions to be used for one-off projects
8. Estimate risk level
‘What is the level of risk?’
− A combination of the likelihood and consequence of a risk (e.g. quantitatively
or qualitatively)
Evaluate—‘is there any need for action?’
9. Evaluate risk tolerability
‘How tolerable is the risk?’
− Risk level (e.g. low risks are generally tolerable and high risks are generally
intolerable)
−Written rules (e.g. standards and legal requirements)
− Potential beneﬁts of taking the risk
10. List required controls
‘What new controls are required to modify the risk?’
− Ineffective existing controls
− Contributory factors
− Controls to prevent undesired events
− Controls to detect undesired events
− Controls to reduce the severity of consequences
11. Deﬁne required actions
‘What actions are required to implement the new controls?’
− Creating a list of required actions
− Action prioritization by considering the criticality of the risks
−Management responsibility for these actions
− Review frequency
12. Document and share ﬁndings
‘What are the ﬁndings and what lessons are learnt?’
− System description
− Limitations and assumptions made in the assessement
− Assessment methodology
− Risk assessment ﬁndings and results
− Discussions of the results
− References
Manage—‘how to manage?’
a. Assemble team
‘Who should be in the assessment team?’
− A facilitator who has experience in risk assessment
− A multidisciplinary group of experts in the system to be assessed
b. Review historical data
‘What can be learnt from historical data?’
− Incident reports
− Patient complaints and claims
− Quality and performance reports
− Safety alerts
− Audit reports
− Reports from external authorities
− Academic literature
Table continued
5A framework to support risk assessment in hospitals
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ﬁrst. Indeed, undesired events are often known in healthcare [20]
and it is more challenging to identify risk sources [10].
Each interview for the user evaluation lasted approximately
80min. Results are shown in Table 5.
Regarding the open-ended questions, all participants responded
to the ﬁrst question. For example, I10 stated, ‘The general frame-
work is familiar. However, it builds in a more robust and compre-
hensive approach to risk assessment and risk control.’ I5 highlighted
the reduced jargon and technical terms and found it very useful.
Similarly, I8 pointed out that ‘the methodology is presented in much
more user-friendly terms than by experts such as ISO 31 000 and
the Health and Safety Executive.’ I9 did not ﬁnd the RAF to be sig-
niﬁcantly different to current standards, but highlighted that the
inclusion of the contributory factors was the part she found the
most useful. She also added ‘I would see my primary use of the RAF
as a training aid used during face to face training sessions, with staff
then able to use the RAF as a post-training prompt to remind them
of the steps they need to follow when carrying out a risk assess-
ment.’ Other participants also claimed that the RAF is familiar to
them in terms of its main steps (i.e. identify, analyse and evaluate),
but they found the details to be different, systematic and helpful.
Seven of the participants responded to the second question. I9
provided three recommendations: to have stronger linkages between
contributory factors and controls/actions, to consider estimating a
target risk score as well as the actual risk score and to clarify to
what extent to follow the RAF and when to do so. I8 recommended
stronger links to objectives and that the framework should allow
opportunities to be assessed as well as downside risks. I10 suggested
there should be more explanation of what ‘system’ means. I7 sug-
gested adding technique cards to explain a number of techniques to
support risk assessment, whereas I4 claimed that adding such cards
would make it too complicated. I2, I3 and I6 recommended develop-
ing speciﬁc cards for different users and use-cases (such as medical
devices, and clinical and organizational risk assessments).
Seven participants provided further comments. I7 stated that the
RAF closely follows their new risk management training handbook.
I4 found the framework to be well presented and simple to under-
stand and stated that it could be used as a teaching aid. I2 found it
Table 4 Continued
Assessment Step [Question to be responded to] Prompts to be considered
c. Identify technqiues
‘Which techniques should be used?’
− System diagrams or ﬂow charts for system description
− Peer review and team discussions to improve judgement
− Brainstorming, SWIFT and the Delphi technique to identiﬁy all risks
− Bow-tie analysis to display the pathway of an event and to examine curent
controls
− FMEA to identify the ways failure could occur and the way they could be
treated
− Risk matrices to help determine risk tolerability and to allocate resources
− Speciﬁc risk assessment forms (e.g. patient falls and moving and handling)
d. Manage activities
‘How should people, data and techniques be deployed throughout
risk assessment?’
− Coordination of all risk assessment activities
− Communication and consultation with all stakeholders of the assessment at
all times
− Iterating through all steps of the risk assessment model
−Monitoring and reviewing assessed risks on a regular basis as well as when
there is a change
− Tailoring the framework to ﬁt assessment needs
Figure 3 Risk assessment form.
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very accessible and easy to follow. I5 stated that they would like to
implement it, I6 found it to be a useful tool, and I1 found the team
approach necessary and found the RAF to be ‘really good’. I10 also
appreciated the work by stating, ‘I think this is an excellent frame-
work that will help many people’.
Based on the ﬁndings from the interviews, the authors further
developed the initial design by providing additional guidance on the
estimation of likelihood and consequence; developing a ‘abridged’
version of the explanation cards; colouring each phase with a differ-
ent colour and numbering each card.
Discussion
This study presented an RAF to guide healthcare staff in undertak-
ing risk assessment. The framework was designed to be systematic
and compatible with existing risk assessment practice. In essence,
the framework simpliﬁes the risk terminology used, and it brings
together the principles of national and international risk assessment
standards as well as a number of techniques (e.g. failure mode and
effects analysis (FMEA), root cause analysis (RCA) and bow-ties).
However, the framework should be tailored to the speciﬁc needs of
the assessment. For example, local hospital requirements might
require a slightly modiﬁed set of risk criteria or the use of a more
speciﬁc contributory factors list. Additionally, we believe the frame-
work could readily be used in different healthcare settings (e.g. pri-
mary care), in the UK and worldwide, since it provides guidance on
the fundamental aspects of risk assessment.
The framework has the potential to identify a large number of risks
through consideration of the system to be assessed, its parts and their
interactions, and it has the potential to determine a wide range of con-
tributory factors. In healthcare, contributory factors are often deter-
mined following an incident by the use of RCA. Yet, too often only a
single cause is identiﬁed [26] despite the provision in the healthcare lit-
erature of a number of lists of multiple potential contributory factors
[27–29]. Identifying many contributory factors not only helps to
understand potential undesired events but also helps to set up effective
controls in the system in order to prevent, detect or reduce the severity
of the undesired events. However, it should also be noted that identify-
ing many risks does not necessarily lead to better risk controls [30].
Even a good risk assessment does not lead to safe systems if the ﬁnd-
ings of the risk assessment are not implemented.
Furthermore, the framework suggests determining the tolerabil-
ity of a risk through the consideration of multiple factors, including
risk scores, organizational and regulatory requirements and the
potential beneﬁts of leaving the risk in place, and the framework
urges its potential users to assemble a multidisciplinary team to
undertake risk assessments. In the English NHS, organization-wide
risks tend to be evaluated by individuals through the use of risk
matrices in which consequence and likelihood axes are used and
categorized, each with a score from 1 to 5 [15]. However, the use of
risk matrices, and thus risk scores, has been criticized in the litera-
ture. To gain (or avoid) attention, lower risk scores can be artiﬁ-
cially recategorized to a higher risk level (or vice versa), and risk
scoring itself can be subjective [15, 31, 32] and can lead to biased
judgements about the management of the risks [33, 34]. However,
taking into account multiple factors to determine the tolerability of
a risk would help minimize the limitations of the use of risk matri-
ces, and the involvement of a multidisciplinary team would help to
minimize subjectivity in risk scoring.
While the RAF has been shown to offer great value in supporting
effective risk assessment, there are some limitations to this study.
First, the list of requirements is not intended to be exhaustive and
constitutes only one approach to addressing the problems identiﬁed
in this paper.
Table 5 Results from the user evaluation statements (RAF = risk assessment framework)
Statements Strongly
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
disagree
Average
Usefulness
I would be likely to identify more risks by using the RAF 2 3 4 1 3.6
I would be likely to analyse risks more effectively by using the RAF 9 1 3.9
I would be likely to better evaluate risks by using the RAF 1 8 1 4
I would be likely to assess risks more systematically by using the RAF 4 3 3 4.1
I found the RAF useful to guide me on risk assessment 3 6 1 4.2
Using the RAF could make me more conﬁdent about risk assessment 2 4 4 3.8
Using the RAF could improve current risk assessment practice 5 4 1 4.4
Using the RAF could make patients safer 3 2 4 1 3.7
Perceived usability
I found the RAF clear and understandable 3 6 1 4.2
I found the RAF easy to use 2 7 1 4.1
I found the RAF easily compatible to our existing approach 2 7 1 4.1
Expected value
The RAF improved my current knowledge on risk assessment 1 3 4 2 3.3
The RAF increased my awareness on risk assessment 1 1 6 2 3.1
The RAF could be beneﬁcial to guide me on risk assessment 4 3 2 1 4
I can see the value in having the RAF 6 2 2 4.4
It is worth spending more time on risk assessment to use the RAF 3 4 3 4
Switching from the old approach to the RAF is essential 3 3 3 1 3.7
What is familiar and what is new about the RAF?
What changes would you recommend to improve the RAF?
RAF, risk assessment framework.
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Second, the framework is built on the Safety I approach, whereas
the Safety II approach might make a signiﬁcant contribution to the
current risk assessment practice, by considering success rather than
only undesired events [35, 36]. However, this approach has not yet
been widely used and there are a number of criticisms regarding its
usability and adoptability [37–39].
Third, the evaluation of the RAF was limited. The evaluation
interviews were not designed to provide duplicating and reversing
questions to establish the reliability of the responses. Additionally,
participants’ views on the proposed RAF could have been biased
since they evaluated the framework based on the explanations pre-
sented rather than on their experience of using it. While the authors
of this paper aimed to minimize such limitations by conducting regu-
lar review meetings, a control study could be conducted to see the
real impact of the framework in comparison to typical current risk
assessment practice in hospitals.
Conclusion
Risk assessment supports decisions made in relation to potential
undesired events. Despite signiﬁcant efforts of healthcare profes-
sionals and organizations, there is a potential to improve current
risk assessment practice in hospitals. In this paper, we designed an
RAF to guide healthcare staff in risk assessment and to address
existing challenges of risk assessment. This was subsequently evalu-
ated to investigate its practical use.
The framework brings the principles of risk assessment together
and learns from the experience of healthcare staff in risk assessment.
It uses simpliﬁed risk terminology to minimize misconceptions and
encourages: convening a multidisciplinary team, describing the sys-
tem to be assessed, deﬁning potential undesired events based on the
system description, determining a wide range of contributory fac-
tors, considering all potential consequences, determining tolerability
of a risks by considering multiple factors and considering control
actions to minimize the potential undesired events deﬁned.
The framework can be used as a training tool to guide in effect-
ive risk assessment as well as a tool to assess risks in healthcare set-
tings. We believe that the framework can contribute to the quality
and safety of care when it is used effectively and the assessment ﬁnd-
ings are implemented.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at International Journal for Quality in
Health Care online.
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